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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATB OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
DAVID RILEY JACOB, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18173 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Aggravated Arson, a 
second-degree felony, under Utah Code Ann., s 76-6-103 (1953), 
as amended, as the result of a fire in an apartment building 
on September 21, 1979. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On December 2fi, 1979, appellant was found competent 
to stand trial in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding. Notice of intent to rely 
on the defense of insanity was filed by appellant on January 
31, 1980. The facts of this case were entered by stipulation 
on April 15, 1980. Appellant was found not guilty by reason 
of insanity before the Honorable Christine M. Durham, sitting 
withoui a jury, on that date. Appellant was committed to the 
Utah State Hospital pending psychiatric examination to 
determine whether his sanity had been restored under Utah Code 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Ann., s 76-24-15 (1953), as amended, repealed July 1, 1980. A 
hearing was held on July 18, 1980 to determine whether 
appellant's sanity had been restored. On January:30, 1981 the 
Honorable Christine M. Durham entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that appellant suffered from chronic 
paranoid schizophrenia that could be controlled by medication. 
The court found that appellant's condition under such 
medication met the test of sanity under S 76-24-15. Appellant 
was, therefore, ordered released under the supervision of 
Adult Probation and Parole on the specific condition that he 
be maintained on medication. Both Adult Probation and the 
Utah State Hospital declined to administer such a program due 
to a lack of statutory authority. 
On June 2, 1981, appellant _requested a hearing 
pursuant to S 77-24-16 to determine if his sanity had been 
restored. That hearing was held on July 22, 1981. The court 
issued a memorandum decision on August 7, 1981 vacating the 
previous order of conditional release. The court found that 
appellant had not recoverea from his mental illness within the 
meaning of the Utah statutes and ordered that he be remanded 
to the custody of the Utah State Hospital.I 
!Although it is not entirely clear, the court's 
order ~f August 7, 1981 appears to be based on s 77-14-5. The 
wording of the order is consistent with that statute. 
-2-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
~ 
the order of the court below that appellant be co~fined to the 
Utah State Hospital until such time as he has recovered from 
his mental illness and denying appellant's request that he be 
released pursuant to former Utah Code Ann., s 77-24-16 (1953), 
as amended, repealed July 1, 1980. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 21, 1979, a fire broke out on the third 
floor of an apartment building at 1310 East 200 South in Salt 
Lake City (R. 35). Appellant was a resident of the building 
and admitted to investigators at the scene that he had started 
the fire with crumpled newspaper in his own and another room 
(R. 36). The reason appellant gave for starting the fires 
what that he wanted to kill himself (R. 36). At the time 
appellant was interviewed, on the day after the fire, his 
.jf, 
thought processes were disrupted (R. 36, 39-50). 
Over a period of ten years prior to the fire, 
appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, a chronic 
mental disease (R. 36). Dr. Breck LeBegue interviewed 
appellant shortly after the fire and concluded that appellant 
was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct but 
lacked, a substantial capacity to conform to the requirements 
of law (R. 37). Dr. Lewis G. Moench also examined appellant, 
reaching the same conclusion (R. 37). 
-3-
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Paranoid schizophrenia is caused by a genetic bio-
chemical defect in the neurotransmitters of the brain (R. 
. ~ 
~ 
137). There is no cure for this mental disorder,;but it may 
be controlled with neuroleptic drugs (R. 137, 138). A patient 
who discontinues use of the drug prescribed will eventually 
begin to re-exhibit syrnp~oms of paranoid schizophrenic. 
behavior (R. 137). The dosage must be closely monitored 
because a patient's needs change with changing circumstances 
(R. 141). Dosages may need to be increased, for example, when 
the patient is exposed to stressful ~ituations (R. 141). 
Appellant has been treated with neuroleptic drugs 
since he was taken into custody (R. 139, 193, 217-218). The 
doctor's orders are for 1/2-cc. of prolyxin every two weeks, 
but appellant also may request extra medication if he feels it 
is necessary7 i.e., if there are symptoms causing "troubles" 
(R. 194). While taking this drug, appellant has improved to 
the best extent possible. No symptoms of the mental disorder 
were manifested by appellant at the time of the hearing (R. 
147, 210). According to nr. Susan Miron, appellant possessed 
the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and 
to conform his conduct to the law at that time (R. 214-215). 
Appellant has received medication for his illness on 
previous occasions (R. 204). Each time he has been released 
-in the past, appellant discontinued use of the drug and became 
overtly psychotic (R. 139, 204, 219). Once he feels well, 
-4-
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appellant no longer recognizes the need for treatment and 
stops taking medication (R. 140). This is a manifestation 
that is common to both normal patients with other=diseases and 
patients with schizophrenia. A schizophrenic, however, lacks 
the insight to understand the nature of the disease and the 
need to continue treatment (R. 140). 
Among the manifestations of appellant's illness when 
not under medication were characteristics such as wanting to 
carve up women's bodies, transvestism, arson and shooting at 
police officers (R. 141). According to Dr. LeBegue, these 
symptoms would be continually displayed by appellant if he 
were not receiving medication (R. 142). Appellant is a threat 
to himself and others when he is delusional {R. 146). It was 
the personal opinion of Dr. van Austin that appellant would 
not continue to take the drugs prescribed if he were released 
( R. 20 5) • 
.. ~ There is not currently in existence a program that 
could assure appellant would continue treatment (R. 158). 
Both Adult Probation and Parole and the Utah State Hospital 
have declined to supervise a conditional release program {R. 
114). Appellant would need to visit a mental therapist every 
two weeks, but clinics have no authority to force patients to 
keep appointments (R. 143, 158). There is no reliable way to 
test a· patient• s blood to determine that he is taking his 
medication because traces of these drugs remain in the body 
-5-
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long after the patient has ceased taking them (R. 159). 
Appellant claims, however, that he would continue treatment if 
released. When he stopped taking the drugs in th~ past, it 
was because he was not taking the proper drug and it produced 
side effects. Appellant believes he is taking the proper drug 
now (R. 219). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED § 77-14-5 
RATHER THAN S 77-24-16. 
Appellant claims that the application of Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 77-14-5 (1980) as the basis of the trial court's 
decision on August 7, 1981 was a violation of the 
constitutional provisions against ex post facto laws. This 
claim is based on the fact that when appellant committed the 
act of arson and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, 
another statute was in effect. Generally, however, statutes 
are not ex post facto merely because they operate on events 
antecedent to their effective dates. Calder v. Bull, 3 u.s. 
386, 390 (1798). It is the effect that the statute will have 
that determines its validity with respect to ex post facto 
inhibitions. State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1010, cert. 
denied, 446 u.s. 970, reh. denied, 448 u.s. 914 (Mont. 1979). 
That etfect must be to materially affect some substantial 
right of the defendant. Id. at 1011. A defendant does not 
-~ 
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have a right to the application of the law in force at the 
time of the crime where the change is procedural and does not 
deprjve him of a substantial right. Id. 
Traditionally, courts have noted that ex post facto 
laws are stimulated by "ambition, or personal resentment and 
vindictive malice." They are statutes that make an act a 
crime that was innocent ·when done, increase the punishment for 
a crime after its commission or deprive an accused of a 
defense available at the time when the act was committed. Id. 
at 1010. Thus, the ex post facto prohibition applies only to 
penal statutes. Estate of Hofferber; 1~7 Cal. Rptr. 854, 28 
Cal. 3d 161, 616 P.2d 836, 849 (1980). See also: Johannessen 
v. United States, 225 u.s. 227 (1912). 
In this case, the application of S 77-14-5 to 
appellant does not fit within the definition of an ex post 
facto law. The statute does not make something criminal that 
was not, it does not eliminate a defense, nor does it increase 
the punishment for a crime. The confinement of a person found 
not guilty by reason of insanity or mental illness is not for 
the purpose of punishment. To say that it is for punishment 
purposes is to say that a court may punish a defendant who has 
been found not guilty under other defenses such as self-
defense or justification. Rather, the verdict of not guilty 
by rea~on of insanity points out the need for a subsequent 
determination of the actor's mental condition, not for 
punishment purposes, but for treatment purposes and to protect 
-7-
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society and/or the actor from potential harm. Bailey v. 
State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953). Therefore, 
§ 77-14-5 is not penal in nature although it appe~rs within 
the criminal code and is triggered by the outcome of a 
criminal proceeding. The statute does not focus on the act 
committed by appellant, but on the presence of mental illness 
as demonstrated at the time of the hearing, not at the time of 
the act. It is not a crime to be mentally ill. Indeed, no 
state would likely attempt to make mental illness a crime. 
"[A] state might [however] determine that the general health 
and welfare require that the victims of these 
afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment." Robinson 
v. California, 370 u.s. fi60 (1962). Other courts have 
characterized commitment proceedings following a finding of 
not guilty by reason of insanity as non-criminal, and 
therefore not ex post facto. See, e.g., Bailey, supra: Ex 
parte:!iayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769, 771 (1930): Ex parte 
Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492 (1912). 
Because the purpose of commitment to a mental 
facility after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity 
is not to punish the actor, s 77-14-5 is not a criminal 
statute. Being a non-criminal statute, its application to 
appellant was not ex post facto. Therefore, ~ 77-14-5 was 
properiy applied in this case. 
-8-
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT RECOVERED FROM HIS 
MENTAL ILLNESS. 
A. THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER THE COURT 
PROPERLY DEFINED SANITY, BUT WHETHER 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
APPELLANT HAD NOT RECOVERED FROM HIS 
MENTAL ILLNESS. 
Appellant claims that the District Court's 
incorporation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law 
dated January 30, 1981 into its order of August 7, 1981 caused 
the latter to be based on an improper definition of sanity. 
Had the proper definition of sanity been utilized, appellant 
would have been released from the Utah State Hospital. 
According to appellant, the proper definition of sanity is the 
opposite of the insanity defense. That is, that appellant 
have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law 
(see Appellant's Brief, Points II and III). 
This appeal, however, is not based on the hearing of 
July 18, 1980 or the order conditionally releasing appellant 
dated January 30, 1981. That hearing and order were pursuant 
to s 77-24-16 and were for the purpose of determining if 
appellant had been restored to sanity. This appeal is based 
on the hearing of July 22, 1981 and the order of August 7, 
1981 wttich were based on s 77-14-5. That statute provides 
-9-
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as follows: 
(2) A defendant committed to the Utah 
State Hospital pursuant to subsection (1) 
may apply, ••• to the district court of 
the county from which he was committed, · 
for an order of release on the grounds 
that he has recovered from his mental 
illness •••• 
Utah Code Ann., S 77-14-5 (1953), as amended. The 
determination made at the July, 1981 hearing and 0ffected by 
the order of August 7, then, was whether appellant had 
recovered from his mental illness. The issue on appeal, 
therefore, is not whether the court applied the proper 
definition of sanity, but it is whether the court properly 
determined that appellant had not recovered from his mental 
illness. Appellant's argument to the contrary confuses the 
issue. To claim that S 77-14-5 was wrongfully applied in the 
order from which he appeals and then to claim that it was not 
actually applied, but that an improper interpretation of 
§ 77-24-16 was applied, is inconsistent. Appellant appears to 
argue that the court may have applied both statutes in the 
order dated August 7, 1981 while the wording of the order is 
consistent only with s 77-14-s.2 
2The order states: "[T]his court cannot find that 
the defendant has recovered from his mental illness within the 
meaning of the ~tah statutes •••• " (R. 115) (emphasis 
added)~ 
-10-
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The proper procedure for seeking review of a 
perceived defect in the 1980 hearing and subseque~t order 
would have been to take an appeal from that order-pursuant to 
the provisions in Utah Code Ann., s 77-35-2n(d)(l) and (j) 
(1953), as amended. Appellant, however, did not appeal from 
that order. Instead, appellant demonstrated acquiescence by 
waiting nearly a full year and requesting a new hearing not 
based upon the original hearing, but to determine if appellant 
had been restored to sanity as of the date of the new hearing. 
Appellant may not now claim error based on the hearing of July 
18, 1980 or the court's subsequent order. 
B. THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD 
IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT 
RECOVERED FROM HIS MENTAL ILLNESS. 
The Utah code requires that a person found not 
guilty by reason of insanity must be committed to the state 
hospital until such time as he has recovered from his mental 
illness, Utah Code Ann., ~ 77-14-5 (1953), as amended. There 
are no standards listed in that statute for determining 
whether a person has recovered from his mental illness. 
However, the general rules of statutory construction require 
that this Court construe statutory language in a way that 
comports with constitutional restraints while carrying out the 
purpos€ of the law. This Court said in Greaves v. State, 
Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974) that: 
-11-
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In determining whether the statute carries 
out [its] purpose, it should not be given 
any tortured or strained application to 
conjectured or hypothetical situations, 
but should be understood and applied in -a 
fair, realistic and practical manner to· 
the situation confronted, and in the 
awareness that all of the law is not 
stated in one sentence or one paragraph, 
but a statute is to be construed and 
applied in relation to other requirements 
of the law. 
Thus, statutes must be construed in a manner that is sensible 
and gives practical effect to their provisions. Id. To 
determine the meaning of S 77-14-5, then, this Court must 
examine the purposes behind the section in context with other 
provisions of the law while giving fair import to its terms so 
as to effect those purposes. 
The fair import of the phrase "recovered from his 
mental illness" in ~ 77-14-5 is that an appellant must be free 
from mental illness or insanity and, therefore, sane. It 
follows that a person who is dangerous to himself or others as 
a result of mental illness is not recovered from his mental 
illness. A determination that a person remains dangerous to 
himself or others, then, is a determination that he has not 
recovered from his mental illness. 
Appellant asserts that the fair import of the 
statute is the requirement that a person have the capacity to 
t 
recognize the difference between right and wrong and to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law in order to be 
-12-
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recovered from mental illness. This is not the same as no 
longer being dangerous according to appellant. Appellant 
suggests that clearly a person who has that capaci_ty is not 
dangerous as a result of his mental illness. Appellant 
further contends that a mere risk of future danger is not 
sufficient to establish that a person has not recovered from 
his mental illness or that he is dangerous and cannot conform 
his actions to law and, therefore, he may not be confined 
under S 7 7-14-5 • 
To read S 77-14-5 in a manner that precludes the 
court from considering factors other than whether the 
appellant knows the difference between right and wrong or can 
conform himself to the requirements of law is to ignore the 
purposes behind the statute. One of the purposes behind the 
statute is to provide treatment for persons who have 
demonstrated a need for treatment by committing an illegal 
act. A second goal is to protect such a person from himself 
or to protect society from acts harmful to others. Consistent 
with these goals is a reading of ~ 77-14-5 that allows the 
trial court to consider whether appellant may become violent 
in the future as a result of his mental illness, even though 
he may have the capacity to know the difference between right 
and wrong and to conform his actions to law at that point in 
time. · 
Other courts have considered these factors in 
deciding whether to maintain a person such as appellant in 
-13-
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custody. In Clark v. State, 151 Ga. App. 853, 261 S.E.2d 764 
(1979), Clark was found not guilty of murder by reason of 
.,, 
insanity. He was committed to a state hospital p9rsuant to 
that determination and applied for release on the grounds that 
he was not mentally ill because he did not meet the standards 
for involuntary commitment. Those standards were that a 
person must present a substantial risk of danger to himself or 
others manifested by recent acts or threats. In holding that 
Clark met the standard the court took into account the fact 
that persons with schizophrenia are subject to a relapse if 
they discontinue use of prescribed medication and that they 
are frequently reluctant to take medication. The court also 
considered relevant the fact that Clark had discontinued 
taking medication in the past and that he had refused 
medication only two weeks prior to the hearing. 
Similarly, the court in State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 
287 A.2d 715, 722 (1972) said: 
• 
It would depart from the justification for 
the recognition of insanity as a defense 
to view the psychotic explosion in 
isolation from the underlying illness. To 
do so would fail to protect the citizens 
from further acute episodes. The 
protection must be equal to the risk of 
further violence. An offender is not 
"restored to reason" unless he is so freed 
of the underlying illness that his 
"reason" can be expected to prevail. 
Hence the underlying or latent personality 
disorder, and not merely the psychotic 
episode which emerged from it, is the 
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relevant illness, and the statutory 
requirement for restoration to reason as a 
pre-condition for release from custody is 
not met so long as that underlying illness 
continues. 
In this case, appellant's past history of release, 
discontinuation of drugs and then relapse is a relevant factor 
to his release. Appellant has demonstrated that he is 
unwilling and/or unable to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of law when he is not under medication. He has 
demonstrated at no time in the past the ability to maintain a 
treatment program to control his behavior. Appellant's 
previous behavior cannot be separated from his underlying 
illness so as to say that when a period of violence has been 
ended by treatment, so too has the mental illness disappeared. 
This is not the case; appellant will in all likelihood never 
be rid of that underlying illness or its manifestations 
characterized by unwillingness to continue treatment and low 
·~ stress tolerance. Because that underlying illness remains, 
appellant remains mentally ill and dangerous although he 
exhibits no symptoms at the present time. 
Although this is a case of first impression in Utah, 
other courts have considered whether a person need only meet 
the test suggested by appellant in this case in order to be 
released. In People v. Mallory, 254 Cal. App. 2d 151, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. ~25 {2d Dist. 1967), the appellant claimed the refusal 
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of the trial court to apply the M'Naughten test3 to 
determine if his sanity had been restored was error because 
the J'Naughten test was used in rendering the verqict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity. The appellate court, in 
determining that M'Naughten was not the proper standard, said: 
it is apparent ••• that the question is 
not merely wh~tner the defendant has 
recovered from 'the state of insanity he ; 
was in when he committed the criminal act, 
that is, the mental state of not knowing 
right from wrong, but the question is 
whether he has fully recovered his sanity. 
Id. at 828. Thus the court appears to state that a person may 
be able to distinguish between right··and wrong but still 
remain insane for purposes of release. Similarly, in People 
v. Giles, 192 Colo. 240, 557 P.2d 408, 411 (1976), the 
Colorado court said that: 
Both the "right and wrong" and 
"irresistible impulse" tests of legal 
insanity refer to the defendant's mental 
condition at the time the alleged crime 
was committed. Those tests are standards 
to aid in determining accountability for 
acts which constitute crimes when done by 
one who is of sound mind. A leading 
authority has stated that the issue to be 
determined at that time is essentially a 
moral one--whether the defendant was 
3The M'Naughten test is defined in LaFave and 
Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law at p. 275: The accused 
suffers from a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind 
such that he does not know the nature and quality of his act 
or tha~ the act was wrong. 
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suff~ciently aware of the wrongful nature 
of his act and adequatley in control of 
his impulses to be held accountable for 
that act. J. Macdonald, Psychiatry and: 
the Criminal 62 (3d ed. 1976). 
Even though the statutory standard for the 
defense of insanity concerns itself solely 
with the defendant's mental state when the 
allegedly criminal conduct occurrea, the 
defendant argues that he was denied due 
process by the trial court's refusal to 
apply that standard to govern his 
application for release more than four 
years after the time to which that 
standard refers. The statutory test for 
release following commitment after a 
successful insanity defense, however, 
concerns itself with the defendant's 
mental state at the time he seeks release. 
Its purpose is to determine whether a 
person who previously claimed he was 
criminally insane, and therefore not 
accountable for actions which otherwise 
would be crimes, should be set free. 
In the instant case it is also not relevant to apply 
the standard used at the time appellant was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity. The Court is no longer concerned with 
the sa~ie issues as were present at that time. What is 
important now is whether a person who has been found mentally 
ill ano therefore not responsible for his criminal actions may 
now be released. The policy issue to be considered is not 
culpability for past crime but potential for future aberrant 
behavior as a result of continuing mental illness. The only 
reasonable way to determine that potential is to take into 
consideration all of those factors that remain present that 
contributed to such behavior in the past ana that indicate 
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the presence of mental illness. These factors include: (1) 
the disease appellant suffers from is biocheical and cannot be 
cured, (2) one manifestation of the disease is to~refuse or 
discontinue treatment, (3) appellant has discontinued 
treatment in the past, (4) there is no statutory power to 
force appellant to continue treatment once he is released, and 
(5) environmental factors such as stress may increase the 
dosage of prolyxin necessary to maintain appellant and such 
factors are not easily controlled outside a structured 
setting. 
C. THE LEGISLATURE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED 
THAT A PERSON SUCH AS APPELLANT DOES 
NOT FIT THE STANDARD OF HAVING 
RECOVERED FROM HIS MENTAL ILLNESS. 
Utah Code Ann., S 77-14-5 was recently amended by 
the legislature. That section now reads: 
(1) When a jury renders a verdict of "not 
guilty by reason of insanity", the court 
shall then conduct a hearing within five 
days to determine if the defendant is 
presently mentally ill •••• 
(2) After the hearing and upon 
consideration of the record, if the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant is still mentally ill 
and because of that mental illness 
presents a substantial danger to himself 
or others, the court shall order him 
committed to the Utah state hospital. The 
defendant shall not be released from 
confinement therein until the court which 
comitted [sic] the defendant shall, after 
hearing, find that the defendant has 
recovered from his mental illness •••• 
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• 
For purposes of this section,a person 
affected with a mental illness which is in 
remission as a result of menication and 
hospitalization shall remain committed to 
the Utah State Hospital if it can be 
determined within reasonable medical 
probability that without continued 
medication and hospitalization the 
defendant's mental illness will reoccur, 
thereby making the person a substantial 
danger to himself or others. 
1983 Utah laws, H.B. No. ·225; Utah Code Ann., S 77-14-~ 
(1983). Under this section, appellant clearly would not be 
eligible for release. This section, coupled with the fact 
that no statutory guidelines existed previously for release of 
persons such as appellant, indicates.that the legislature 
intended that appellant and others like him would not be 
released under the old s 77-14-5. Clearly, the legislature 
intended that appellant's dangerousness or potential for 
danger should be considered when determining if he had 
recovered from his mental illness under S 77-14-5 along with 
the fact that he must be maintained on medication. 
POINT III 
SECTION 77-14-5 IS CONSTITUTIONAL BOTH ON 
ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 
77-24-15 and 77-24-16 NEED NOT BE 
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT. 
Appellant argues that former § 76-24-15 and 
S 76-24-16 are void for vagueness.4 This argument is 
4see Appellant's Brief, Point III, p. 16 and Point 
II, p. 11. 
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based on the fact that no definition of sanity or standards 
for restoration to sanity are supplied within the statute. 
Because no definitions or standards are supplied,~appellant 
contends that the judge was free to apply the statute in an 
arbitrary and discriminatory manner. No case law is cited 
supporting this theory or demonstrating that similarly 
situated persons have been released in this state. 
Furthermore, these statutes were not applied to appellant in 
the hearing and order from which he appeals. As argued above, 
the statute applied in the hearing and order from which 
appellant appeals was ~ 77-14-5. An argument that S 76-24-15 
and S 76-24-16 are void for vagueness, then, is not relevant. 
Aside from the fact that these statutes are irrelevant is the 
fact that they have been repealed. Appellant asks this Court 
to declare unconstitutional statutes that have been repealed 
and no longer carry any force. This is an exercise in 
fut il~~Y· 
B. SECTION 77-14-5 IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
The general and well established rule is that 
statutes are presumed to be valid and should not be declared 
unconstitutional by a reviewing court if they may be found 
constitutional on any reasonable basis. Unless a statute is 
found to be unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it will be upheld. Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P.2d 
805, 806 (1974)1 State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 
( 19 73) • In fact , the: 
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prohibition against excessive vagueness 
does not invalidate every statute which a 
reviewing court believes could have been 
drafted with greater precision. Many 
statutes will have some inherent 
vagueness, for in most English words and 
phrases there lurk uncertainties. 
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1974). Where the language of 
the statute is in words of common understanding, even though 
"marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than 
meticulous specificity," the statute will be upheld if it 
"defines boundaries sufficiently distinct for citizens, 
policemen, juries and appellate courts," Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112, 114 ( 1972), and is "sufficiently 
clear and definite" for "persons of ordinary intelligence" to 
understand its meaning. Greaves, at 806. 
The statute in this case could be no more clear than 
it is already. Persons of ordinary intelligence understand 
what it is to be mentally ill, they are not required to guess 
at the meaning of these words as suggested by appellant. 
Furthermore, if this Court follows the legislative intent of 
the statute, as demonstrated by the recent amendment, it must 
find that the statute is not vague. The statute was 
interpreted by the trial court to include factors of 
dangerousness and the need for future treatment just as the 
legislature intended. Section 77-14-5 is, therefore, not 
rendered void due to excessive vagueness. 
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C. APPELLANT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
INCARCERATED BECAUSE OF HIS STATUS. 
Appellant claims that he is required to show that he 
is permanently sane in order to be released and that there is 
nothing more he can do to prove himself sane (see Appellant's 
Brief, Point IV). Therefore, to continue to confine him to 
the Utah State Hospital is incarceration based on appellant's 
status as "a sane person with schizophrenia, a mental illness 
for which he bears no responsibility" (Appellant's Brief, p. 
23). 
Appellant misconstrues the purpose behind his 
confinement to the hospital. It is not for the purpose of 
punishment that appellant is forced to remain there, but for 
treatment of a disease he admittedly suffers. The argument is 
also contradictory in that it would appear to be impossible by 
definition to be a sane person with a mental illness. 
Appellant himself admits this by stating that: 
[A] person is either restored to sanity or 
not restored to sanity. A person is 
either able to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct and conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law or he is not. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 18). 
To support his position that he is incarcerated on 
the basis of status, appellant cites Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962). In that case, a drug addict was 
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convicted and imprisoned under a statute making it a crime to 
be a drug addict. The United States Supreme Court held that 
it was unconstitutional to punish a person merely.because he 
was a drug addict. The Court, however, distinguished between 
punishment for status and confinement for treatment purposes. 
The Court stated: 
It is unlikely that any State at this 
moment in history would attempt to make it 
a criminal offense for a person to be 
mentally il, or a leper, or to be 
afflicted with a venereal disease. A 
State might determine that the general 
health and welfare require that the 
victims of these and other human 
afflictions be dealt with by compulsory 
treatment, involving quarantine, 
confinement, or sequestration. 
Id. at 666. It is a proper exercise of authority for this 
state to determine that persons such as appellant are 
dangerous to society and therefore that they must remain 
confined so long as they suffer from mental illness. TO be 
released, a person need only show that he no longer suffers 
from the particular mental illness for which he was confined. 
Appellant can and should be released only when he can 
demonstrate that he is free from this mental illness. He need 
not show that some other mental illness will never affect him 
again: only that this mental illness will not. Because he 
cannot show that he is free from mental illness at this time 
and be9ause he is confined for treatment rather than 
punisnrnent purposes, appellant has not been incarcerated on 
the basis of status. 
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CONCLUSION 
The application of S 77-14-5 to determine if 
appellant had recovered from his mental illness does not meet 
the definition of an ex post facto law and does not punish him 
on the basis of status because the statute is not criminal in 
nature. The trial court properly applied that section and 
properly defined it so as to include factors such as 
dangerousness and possibility of relapse. This is further 
indicated by the fact that the legislature recently amended 
the statute along those same lines. Because this definition 
could easily be reached by persons of ordinary intelligence, 
the statute is not void for vagueness due to the lack of these 
specific standards in the original version. For these 
reasons, the order of August 7, 1981 confining appellant to 
the Utah State Hospital should be affirmed and his request for 
release pursuant to former s 77-24-16 should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of May, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
AtiJ;;~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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2nd day of May, 1983. 
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